1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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4	KIMBERLY ENRIGHT, et al, on behalf of herself and all
5	others similarly situated, PLAINTIFFS
6	Vs. CIVIL NO.
7	21-19364 (GC) FCA US, LLC, et al,
8	DEFENDANTS
9	
10	MARCH 27, 2023 CLARKSON S. FISHER COURTHOUSE
11	402 EAST STATE STREET TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08608
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13	B E F O R E: THE HONORABLE GEORGETTE CASTNER
14	U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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16	APPEARANCES: (BY TELEPHONE)
17	LITE, DePALMA, GREENBERG & AFANADOR, LLC BY: BRUCE GREENBERG, ESQUIRE
18	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
19	GIBBS LAW GROUP, LLP BY: ROSEMARY RIVAS, ESQUIRE
20	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
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22	COURT'S OPINION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO APPOINT INTERIM LEAD
23	COUNSEL (ECF NO. 29)
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25	FRANCIS J. GABLE, C.C.R., C.R.R. OFFICIAL U.S. REPORTER
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1 THE COURT: This matter comes before the Court upon 2 the filing of Plaintiffs motion to appoint interim counsel 3 (ECF No. 29). 4 On June 21, 2022, the Court consolidated two related 5 class actions (Enright v. FCA US, LLC and Lindsey v. FCA US, 6 LLC), both of which allege that Defendants FCA US, LLC and 7 Stellantis N.V. imposed deceptively inflated surcharges when 8 selling new cars. (ECF No. 25). The Court allowed Plaintiffs 9 time to meet and confer about a leadership structure to 10 represent the proposed class. (ECF No. 25.) 11 Plaintiffs jointly moved on July 22, 2022 pursuant 12 to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) ("Rule") for the Court to appoint 13 Gibbs Law Group LLP ("Gibbs"), Handley Farah & Anderson PLLC 14 ("HFA"), and Kaliel Gold PLLC ("Kaliel Gold") -- as Interim 15 Co-Lead Counsel for the proposed class, and Lite DePalma 16 Greenberg & Afanador, LLC ("Lite DePalma"), as Interim Liaison 17 Counsel. (Br. In Supp., ECF No. 29.) 18 Defendants responded on August 1, 2022 and opposed the appointment of three interim lead counsel and one interim 19 20 liaison counsel. (Br. In Opp'n, ECF No. 31.) However, 21 Defendants do not oppose the appointment of single interim 22 lead counsel and a single interim liaison counsel. (Br. In 23 Opp'n 2.) 24 The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Appoint 25 Interim Lead Counsel and Interim Liaison Counsel (ECF No. 29)

1 on March 15, 2023. After consideration of the Parties' 2 submission and the arguments made during the March 15th 3 hearing, the Court will appoint Gibbs and HFA as interim 4 co-lead counsel and Lite DePalma as interim liaison counsel. For sake of expediency, the Court will not read citations and 5 footnotes onto the record. Those will be included in the 6 7 transcript should counsel choose to order the transcript. 8 The Court will briefly summarize its findings on 9 this call and an Order will follow. 10 The appointment of class counsel is governed by 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule") 23(q). 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(q)(3) provides that the 13 Court "may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a 14 putative class before determining whether to certify the 15 action as a class action." Yaeger v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 16 Civ. No. 14-4490, 2014 WL 7883689, at \*1 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2014) 17 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(G)(3)). "It appears to be 18 generally accepted that the considerations set out in Rule 19 23(g)(1)(C), which govern the appointment of class counsel 20 once a class is certified, apply equally to the designation of 21 interim class counsel before certification." Durso v. Samsung 22 Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 2:12-5352, 2013 WL 4084640, at \*2 23 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2013). 24 Under Rule 23(q), the Court must consider the 25 following: (i) the work counsel has done in identifying or

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investigating potential claims in the action; (ii) counsel's
experience in handling class actions, other complex
litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action;
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and (iv) the
resources that counsel will commit to representing the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(A)(i)-(iv). "The Court also has the
discretion to appoint more than one firm to act as co-lead
counsel." In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-0699, 2017 WL
4122437, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2017). "If more than one
adequate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint
the applicant best able to represent the interests of the
class." In re: Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., Civ. No. 2:15-2661,
2015 WL 12723036, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2015) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(q)(2)
          Additionally, the Court "may consider any other
matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23
(q)(1)(B).
          The Court notes that "a multi-firm structure may, at
times, promote effective representation of the purported
class's interest." In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., No.
17-CV-4326, 2018 WL 514501, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2018).
However, "approval of several lead counsel may precipitate
friction and a lack of coordination among counsel." In re
Milestone Sci. Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 178 (D.N.J. 1999).
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In making its decision, the Court will first turn to the Rule 23(g)(1)(A) factors:

First, counsel asserts that they have diligently worked to identify and investigate any potential claims by researching Consumer Reports of destination charges in recent years, the legislative history of the Automobile Information Disclosure Act of 1958, and behavior economics regarding pricing practices, inflation markers, and historic transportation costs. (Br. In Supp. 12.) However, counsel does not specifically identify which of the four firms (or if all of the four firms) did this work.

Due to their research, counsel indicate that they are prepared to file a detailed consolidated complaint that will contain: Details about the automotive industry's history with artificially inflating the stated cost of transporting new vehicles to dealerships, coined "phantom freight"; discussion of the legislative history and hearings that led Congress to pass the Automobile Information Disclosure Act, which curbed phantom freight in the 1950s; an explanation of how companies like Chrysler (now FCA) once charged phantom freight, but due to Congressional pressure, abandoned the practice; analysis of the market forces and behavioral economics behind pricing tactics like those challenged here, and how they affect consumer perceptions and spending patterns; and information about how Defendants' destination fee surcharges have risen at

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    rates far faster than actual transport costs or inflation.
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    (Br. In Supp. 13.)
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           Also, counsel notes that they have interviewed dozens
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    of potential class members, which will allow them to file a
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    comprehensive complaint with multiple named plaintiffs.
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    Again, however, it is not clear which of the four firms
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    conducted the interview or whether it was all of them.
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              The Court notes that all four firms have significant
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    experience in handling complex class action litigation.
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    Specifically, both Gibbs and HFA have significant experience
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    trying automobile related class-actions. See, e.g., In re
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    American Honda Motor Co., Inc., CR-V Vibration Marketing and
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    Sales Practices Litiq., Civ. No. 15-2661 (S.D. Ohio) (Gibbs);
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    Glenn v. Hyundai Motor Company Civ. No. 15-02052 (C.D. Cal.)
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    (Gibbs); Porsche Gasoline Litigation, Civ. No. 15-2672 (N.D.
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    Cal.) (Gibbs); True v. American Honda Motor Co., Civ. No.
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    07-0287 (C.D. Cal.) (HFA); Precht v. Kia Motors America, Civ.
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    No. 14-01148 (C.D. Cal.) (HFA); Davitt v. American Honda
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    Motor, Co., Civ. No. 13-00381 (D.N.J.) (HFA); Hadley v. Subaru
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    of America, Inc., Civ. No. 15-07210 (D.N.J.) (HFA); Lyman v.
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    Ford Motor Company, Civ. No. 21-10024 (E.D. Mi.) (HFA).
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              However, while all four firms have experience with
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    class actions, it appears that Kaliel Gold's class action
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    experience cited in Plaintiffs' brief largely arises from the
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    financial services industry. See, e.g., Hinton v. Atlantic
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Union Bank, Civ. No. 20-00651 (E.D. Va.); Kelly v. Community
Bank, Civ. No. 18-00919 (N.D.N.Y.); Gonzalez v. Banner Bank,
Civ. No. 20-05151 (E.D. Wa.); Lambert v Navy Federal Credit
Union, Civ. No. 19-00103 (E.D. Va.); White v. Members 1st
Credit Union, Civ. No. 19-00556 (M.D. Pa.) Morris, et al. v.
Bank of America, N.A., Civ. No. 18-00157 (W.D.N.C.)
          Given Gibbs' and HFA's experience specifically
involving automobile class actions and the fact that these two
firms are currently litigating similar cases against FCA in
California and Delaware, the Court finds Gibbs and HFA have
more experience handling the types of claims asserted in this
action and are likely to have greater knowledge of the
applicable law over Kaliel Gold. See Waudby v. Verizon
Wireless Servs., LLC, 248 F.R.D. 173, 177 (D.N.J. 2008)
(noting attorney experience in an area of law supports the
idea that they will be able to devote more resources to a
specific litigation).
          Based on Plaintiffs' submission, the Court does find
that all four firms make a proper showing that they can devote
the proper time and resources to the proposed class and does
not base its holding on this factor.
          While all four firms have significant experience in
class actions, Gibbs' and HFA's substantial experience
prosecuting automobile class actions in particular, the Court
finds that the Rule 23(g)(1)(A) factors weigh in favor of
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1 Gibbs and HFA as being better able to represent the class as 2 interim co-lead counsel over Kaliel Gold. See Galicki v. New 3 Jersey, Civ. No. 14-169, 2014 WL 4979499, at \*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 4 6, 2014) (finding that three out of the four Rule 23(g) 5 factors support either group of proposed lead counsel, however the Court chose the lead counsel based on their greater 6 7 experience in the specific area class action work). Additionally, as noted above the Court "may consider 8 9 any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and 10 adequately represent the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (g)(1)(B). 11 12 Specifically, this District has occasionally turned 13 to the Manual for Complex Litigation for guidance when 14 appointing interim counsel in the past. See Yaeger v. Subaru 15 of Am., Inc., Civ. No. 14-4490, 2014 WL 7883689, at \*2 (D.N.J. 16 Oct. 8, 2014) (using the Manual for Complex Litigation as 17 quidance). 18 The Manual provides that in addition to the Rule 19 23(g) factors, a court may consider involvement in parallel 20 cases in other courts; any existing attorney-client 21 relationship with a named party; and a fee and expense 22 arrangements that may accompany the proposed appointment. 23 Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.272. 24 The Court is aware that both Gibbs and HFA represent 25 consumers in California and Delaware in similar litigation

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against FCA. See Gunn v. FCA US, LLC, Civ. No. 22-02229 (N.D. Cal.); Beeney v. FCA US, LLC, Civ. No. 22-00518 (D. Del.) Given the similarities of this case to the parallel cases in California and Delaware, that the cases will likely require similar motion practice and discovery, and that Gibbs and HFA likely maintain synergies due to their history working together, the Court finds that Gibbs and HFA as interim co-lead counsel along with Lite DePalma as interim liaison counsel are best able to represent the interests of the proposed class. While Plaintiffs agree on the appointment of three firms as interim co-lead counsel, the Court finds at this time that having three firms serve as interim co-lead counsel may result in greater costs, decreased efficiency, and difficulty managing the litigation. See In re Remicade Antitrust Litig., 2018 WL 514501, at \*2. This case currently only has three named Plaintiffs across two consolidated cases with two defendants. As a result, the Court finds that the size and scope of the current case does not warrant three interim co-lead counsel firms. See, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (appointing three co-lead counsel in a case involving 52 separate actions) The Court also notes that "[t]he first-filed case may be a relevant factor when the factors for class counsel do not tilt heavily in either direction and there is a need for

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an objective tie-breaker." Lowery v. Spotify USA Inc., Civ No. 15-09929, 2016 WL 6818756, at \*3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2016). But "it would be an abuse of discretion to appoint an attorney as class counsel solely because he may have won the race to the courthouse." Id. "When there is not a need for an objective tie-breaker, courts often appoint class counsel from a case that was not first filed." Cadena v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Civ. No. 20-511, 2020 WL 3107798, at \*5 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted). While Kaliel Gold was counsel on the first-filed case in this matter, for the reasons stated above, the Court does not believe that a tiebreaker is needed based on considerations of the factors under Rule 23(q). Additionally, Plaintiffs point to In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation for why the Court should adopt their proposed legal structure. In In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litiq, the Court appointed three firms to serve as co-lead counsel (including Gibbs) and one firm to serve as interim counsel. Civ. No. 07-2720, 2011 WL 4020862, at \*8 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2011) (recognizing that the case "involved years of difficult and hard-fought litigation

assurance the Plaintiffs would prevail or that Class counsel

by able counsel on both sides" and that "there was no

would receive any fees. The Settlement was a favorable

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one."). However, In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation was a multidistrict litigation and appeared to have been much larger in scope than this case. As a result, the Court does not find the legal structure from In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litigation to be persuasive for purposes of this motion. Based on the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' Motion. Court hereby appoints Gibbs and HFA as interim co-lead counsel and Lite DePalma as interim liaison counsel. Should this litigation significantly increase in scope, or upon any other showing of good cause, this Court is willing to reconsider this ruling. All counsel are instructed to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts and to control fees and costs. Given that the Court has oversight power in the award of attorney fees resulting from a class action, the Court is confident that all counsel will bill appropriately and efficiently. In re Diet Drugs, 582 F.3d 524, 537 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that awards for attorneys' fees in a class action are always subject to court approval). An appropriate Order will be entered consistent with the Court's findings set forth on the record today.

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    "I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
    record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter."
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    /S/ Francis J. Gable, C.C.R., C.R.R. March 27, 2023
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    Signature of Court Reporter
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